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GENE LARSON JR., 
DBA TRUCK PARTS 
Defendant. 
) 
Case No. 14414 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO 
QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND WRIT OF EXECUTION AND 
MOTION TO STAY WRIT OF EXECUTION AND TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
JOHN MCCOY 
325 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENNETH L. ROTHEY 
2275 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
0O0 
) 
\ GENUINE PARTS CO., : 
. ) 
Plaintiff, :" 
) 
! vs. • : Case No. 14414 
i ) 
I GENE LARSON JR., : 
! DBA TRUCK PARTS ) 
! - : 
| Defendant. ) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
_•_____ 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order denying Defendant/ 
Appellant's Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Writ of 
Execution, and Motion to Stay Writ of Execution and to Set 
Aside Default and Judgment by Default based upon Defendant/ 
Appellant's contention that serious questions existed respecting 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the validity of the Judgment by 
Default in light of the pleadings filed by the Plaintiff/Respondent. 
E 
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DISPOSITION BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
• • " • " ' " " " ' " • " ' ™ • ' " i -—immmmmmmmmwmimmtmm—m wmtmmmmmnK i mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^mm ; 
Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion to Quash which came 
on for hearing on December 8, 1975, before the Honorable Judge 
Bryant H. Croft after having been continued from the original 
setting of October 23, 1975. Judge Croft denied Defendant/ 
Appellant's motion in its entirety. Defendant/Appellant 
thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal, but the Notice was not 
docketed by the District Court Clerk until January 8, 1976, 
the same time that a written Order of disposition was signed 
and filed by Judge Croft. Said Order was not filed within 
five days as provided by the District Court rules; and in any 
event was not served upon Defendant/Appellant's attorney by 
Plaintiff/Respondent's attorney. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Appellant seeks an Order of this Honorable 
Court reversing the Order of Judge Croft and directing that the 
Judgment by Default be set aside and the action dismissed 
without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Attendant therewith 
Defendant /Appellant also seeks relief from this Court from 
the Writ of Execution now pending and exhoneration of the 
Supersedeas Botid. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant/Appellant, as a result of an open account with* 
Plaintiff/Respondent became indebted to Plaintiff/ Respondent in 
the total amount of $13, 278. 45 (Record Page 30). Defendant/ 
Appellant had no agreement -or obligation with Plaintiff/ 
Respondent to pay attorney's fees or interest on said account. 
In order-to-discharge said obligation and to obtain sufficient 
time to discharge the same, Defendant/Appellant executed 
several promissory notes with different due dates, wherein 
he agreed to pay court costs, attorney's fees, and interest to 
Plaintiff/Respondent (Record Page 33 through 44). Between 
the date of execution of said notes on January 12, 1975, and the 
date Plaintiff/Respondent filed its Complaint herein in July, 
1975, (Record Page 1), Defendant/Appellant delivered to • 
Plaintiff/Respondent goods and materials and received 
from Plaintiff/Respondent a credit against said notes 
($1, 400. 00 Record Page 27 and $3, 366. 67 Record Page 50). 
On July 28, 1975, Plaint iff/Respondent filed its Complaint. 
At that time the only amount due pursuant with the promissory 
notes which are the subject of Claim 2 of Plaintiff/Respondent's 
Complaint, after offsetting the credits hereinabove indicated 
was approximately $1,624. 77 including interest. 
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This action was commenced by the service of a Summons 
pursuant with Rule 3a of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on 
July 17, 1975. Plaintiff/Respondent's filed their complaint 
with the Clerk of the Court and mailed a copy to the last known 
address of the defendant on July 28, 1975, the 11th day after 
the commencement of the action (Record Pages 1, 2, and 3) 
Defendant was not residing at the address appearing in Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's Affidavit (Record Page 3 and 14). Plaintiff/ 
Respondent entered the default of the Defendant/Appellant on 
August 26, 1975, and on the same date took Judgment by Default 
before the Honorable Judge Marcellus K. Snow based upon certain 
promissory notes which were reduced to judgment. Said 
judgment was for the total sum of $10,152. 41 principal and 
interest with attorney's fees of $1,723. 57 (Record Page 8), 
On October 14, 1975, Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Writ of 
Execution and Motion to Stay Writ of Execution and to Set Aside 
Default and Judgment by Default, which was denied on December 8, 
1975. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DOES RULE 3(a)(2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS APPLIED TO THE CASE 
AT HAND VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAW UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
j In 1951 the Utah Supreme Court adopted uniform 
j Rules of Civil Procedure for all Courts of the State of Utah. 
j 
Foi* the most part, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure track 
i 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see United States Code, 
1
 United States Code Annotated, and United States Code Service 
L. ed.). ' * 
j • 
i | In the case at hand, Defendant/Appellant was served 
with a Summons, which, under the provisions of Rule 3(a)(2) 
commenced the action herein. This Rule, unlike Rule 3 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the commencement 
of an action by the service of a Summons only; there being 
no requirement for the concurrent service or a complaint. 
The effect of both rules is to give the Court jurisdiction for 
the purpose of prosecuting an action unless and until such time 
as jurisdiction is challenged on other grounds or otherwise lost. 
In order to retain jurisdiction under the Utah Rules it is 
required that the initiating party take certain mandatory i j, 
steps after the commencement of an action by the issuance of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J after the service of the Summons on the Defendant, file a copy 
I of the Complaint, the Summons, and Proof of Service of the 
i Summons; and Plaintiff has the further mandatory obligation 
J to either serve or mail a copy of the complaint to the defendant 
! if his address is known or in lieu thereof, to deposit a copy of 
j the complaint with the clerk. If these things are not done 
; as provided in the Rule, the action shall be deemed dismissed 
i and the Court shall have no further jurisdiction thereof. 
In this case, the Defendant/Appellant was served 
with a Summons on Thursday, the 17th day of July, 1975, 
On Monday, the 28th day of July, 1975, Plaintiff/Respondent 
filed a copy of the Summons, Return of Service, Complaint, 
and an Affidavit of Mailing (Record Pages 1 through 6). 
This filing took place in the afternnon of the 11th day. 
Because of the mandatory language of the Rule, Defendant/ 
Appellant filed a Motion on October 14, 1975, seeking the 
termination of ail proceedings in this matter (Record page 
12 and 13) along with a Notice of Hearing (Record Page 21). 
On January 8, 1976, the Honorable Judge Bryant H. Croft entered 
his Order declaring that the complaint was filed within 
ten days after service of summons on the defendant as 
computed within the time computations as set forth in 
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Further, £nd-without notice or opportunity to the Defendant/ 
'""v. 
, Appellant to object to the findings of the Court, the Honorable 
Judge Croft further found that the defendant could have requested 
a copy of the Complaint in accordance with Rule 3 but did not 
take any action until a Writ of Execution was served on him 
(Record Page 53). These findings, made without opportunity 
of Defendant/Appellant to object thereto, totally ignore 
Rule 77(a), 52(a), and 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. 
Rule 77(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
"The district courts shall be deemed always 
open for the purpose of filing any pleading or 
other proper paper, of issuing and returning 
mesne and final process, and of making and 
directing all interlocutory motions, orders, 
and rules. " 
; Rule 12(a) of the Utah Rules allows the defendant 20 days 
to answer a Complaint after the service of Summons is 
complete. In accordance with these Rules and the Court's 
I application of Rule 6(a) in interpreting Rule 3(a) it appears 
i 
!
 obvious that in cases where the Defendant is served with 
l a Summons and Complaint setting forth sufficient allega-
i 
| tions to constitute a cause of action that he would have 20 
! - . . • * -
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fuil days to review the allegations and articulate his defenses 
in a responsive pleading. On the other hand, and within the 
discretionary parameters of Rule 3(a), after the initiating 
party commences an action by service of a Summons, he 
not only restricts substantially the amount of time that the 
defendant has to review and respond to the complaint; but 
also is able to employ the use of the mails for delivery of 
the Complaint which he could not otherwise do if the Summons 
and Complaint were served together, and impose on the 
defendant an affirmative duty to seek out and ascertain 
for himself the nature of Plaintiffs Complaint against him. 
No such duty is imposed upon the defendant who is served with a 
Summons and Complaint by processes described in Rule 
4(a through e). To further compound this process, the 
Rules provide that once an action is commenced, whether by 
service of a Summons or the filing of a Complaint, that 
service in person can still be compelled in at least two 
circumstances. Under Rule 3(b) if the defendant serves a 
written demand upon the Plaintiff for a copy of d Complaint 
not served upon him with the Summons, then, irt that event, 
the Plaintiff is required to serve a copy on him before the time 
for answering commences to run. Under Rule 5(a) if an 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amended pleading is filed stating new and additional claims for 
relief after an action has been commenced in either manner 
in accordance with Rule 3(a), service of such new or additional 
claims are required to be served in the same manner provided 
for the service of a Summons in Rule 4. 
Defendant/Appellant contends that Rule 6(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (a rule which is identical in 
: substance with Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) 
was not intended by this honorable court to serve as a basis 
for*the extension of the Court's jurisdiction, but merely was 
| intended as a procedural regulation; and, in any event under 
: fundamental standards of Constitutional Law defendant contends 
I that Rule 3(a)(b) as applied to the circumstances in this case 
; violates defendant's right to due process and equal protection 
of the laws. 
it is conceded by Defendant /Appellant that procedural 
due process is a subject wholly within the authority of the respective 
states to regulate and control, Brown vs. Mississippi 297 US 
278, 80 L. ed. 682, 56 S. Ct. 461(1936). This prerogative 
however, does not transcend the requirement for fundamental 
protection such as the requirements for hearing and notice, 
Hooker vs. Los Angeles, 188 US 314, 47 L. ed. 487, 23 S. Ct. 
395 (1955), nor breach the prohibitions against ^ * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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unreasonableness or arbitrariness, American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 
219 US 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 S. Ct. 200(1910). In order to meet 
the test of equal protection and due process as the same relate 
to procedural law, the law must operate equally on all persons-
in like circumstances and afford all persons of a reasonable 
class (i. e. civil litigants) an equal opportunity for notice to be 
heard, Jones vs. Brim, 165 US 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 
282, affm. 11 Utah 200, 39 Pac. 825 (1895), State ex. rel. 
Sweezer vs. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 SW 2d 897, 24 ALR 
2d 340 (1950). 
In this matter two essential requirements of due 
process, notice and an opportunity to be heard, as appear 
Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde when Rule 3(a) is tested against known 
standards, see National Farmers Union Property and Gas Co. 
vs. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P 2d 249, 61 ALR 2d 635 
(1955). As applied to the facts in this case, it is clear that 
the Defendant/Appellant, Gene Larson Jr., was not offered 
an equal opportunity under the law with all persons in a 
reasonable class (i. e. civil litigants as defendants) since the 
notice afforded him under Rule 3(a) (1) is not controlled by 
judicial due process or procedure but is up to the election 
of the initiating party, and (2) only gave him the barest 
sketch of Plaintiffs Complaint, which sketch in and of itself 
would not constitute sufficient basis for the entry of a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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judgment in the absence of more affirmative allegations 
Cuebas y Arrehdondo vs. Cuebas y Arrendondo, 223 
US 376, 56 L. ed. 476, 32 S. Ct. 277 (1912) holding as 
a general rule that a Judgment by Default must be justified 
by the pleadings and that in the absence of essential 
averments to sustain a cause of action it has been 
held to Hie fraud on the part of the Plaintiff to procure 
a Court to enter a judgment, Larson vs. Williams 
100 Iowa 110, 63 NW 464 (1895). It goes without saying 
that Mr. Larsen was not afforded the same opportunity 
i 
to be heard and respond as a person receiving a 
Summons and Complaint concurrently would have been. 
At best he would have had nine days to respond rather 
than twenty days as provided in Rule 12(a) and the 
language of the Summons served upon him (Record 
Page 5) that, of course, assumes that he received the 
complaint the same day that it was mailed. The 
effect of Rule 3(a) in this case is to allow the moving 
party either pro se or through their attorney to elect 
different procedures which is a fundamental violation 
of due process and equal protection. 
* M * 
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POINT II 
DOES THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
BASED UPON PROMISSORY NOTES CONSTITUTE A 
FRAUDULENT AND VOIDABLE JUDGMENT WHEN 
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT DO 
NOT ALLEGE THAT PRESENTMENT AND DIS-
HONOR EVER OCCUR ED OR THAT THE NOTES 
WERE DUE, IF THE NOTES THEMSELVES AS 
REDUCED TO JUDGMENT REFLECT A DUE DATE 
OCCURRING AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF THE 
ACTION AND AFTER THE JUDGMENT BY 
DEFAULT WAS ENTERED. 
Judgment by Default was entered against the defendant 
in this matter by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on the 
26th day of August, 1975 (Record Page 8). Said judgment 
was based upon a series of promissory notes (Record Page 
33 through 44). The action was commenced on the 17th day 
of July, 1975. At that time, ignoring for the moment the 
fact that no presentment or dishonor was ever made or 
alleged to have been made, the maximum amount due excluding 
interest and attorney's fees would have been $6, 000. 00 
without regard to offsets. Plaintiff/Respondent in its 
on Affidavits in this matter (Record Pages 26, 28, and 29 
and the accompanying exhibits Record Pages 27 and 50) 
admitting that as of July 17, 1075, Defendant/Appellant was 
entitled-to credits in an amount of $4,766. 37 leaving a 
balance due exclusive of interest of $1, 233. 63. 
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; Plaintiff/Respondent nevertheless, took judgment on all notes 
I even though the same were not then due and took judgment for 
$1,723. 57, in attorney's fees which Defendant/Appellant 
contends were not due to them (Record Page 8). 
Upon reviewing Plaintiff/Respondent's Complaint 
on file herein and more particularly Claim II, Plaintiff/ 
Respondent has failed to allege that said notes were due, 
or that presentment and dishonor had taken place. 
j In the Larson vs. Williams case supra, it 
| was held that the judgment amounted to fraud because the 
! Plaint iff/Respondent had knowingly procurred the Court's 
i signature without alleging essential elements to a cause 
j of action, in other jurisdictions, Judgments by Default have 
i 
! been regarded as void where they were based solely on 
I 
! allegations of a complaint so deficient in substantive averments 
as to negate the existence of a cause of action at the time 
| of its rendition, Apple vs. Edwards 123 Mont. 135, 211 P. 2d. 138, 
(1949), Cleveland vs. Cleveland 262 Ala. 90, 77 So. 2d. 343 
(1955). Defendant/Appellant contends that the record in this 
case which shows on its face that the notes sued upon were 
at least in part not yet due, is a sufficient basis for vacating 
the judgment rendered herein pursuant with Defendant/Appellant's 
Motioa and Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In support of this contention, Defendant/Appellant 
respectfully cites the Court's attention to the following 
provisions of Article III of the Uniform Commercial Code 
of the State of Utah 
1. A note is not due until the date stated on 
the face of the note, Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-114. 
2. A cause of action on a promissory note does 
not accrue against the maker thereof until the day after 
maturity, Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-122(l)(a). 
3. The partial failure of consideration (i. e. 
demand for attorney's fees on a note not yet due) is 
a defense pro tanto against any person not a holder 
in due course, Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-408. In 
this case Plaintiff/Respondent received judgment for 
$1,723. 57 in attorney's fees (Record Page 8). 
4. Presentment and notice of dishonor is 
required by the holder of a note unless presentment 
is waived, Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-503. 
5. Presentment was not waived in this case, 
Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-511 (see also record in 
its entirety). 
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i CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant was denied the fundamental 
protections of due process and equal protection of the laws 
afforded all citizdns of this State by virtue of the discretion 
granted to persons initiating civil actions in this State pursuant 
with Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
light of the Judgment entered against him in this matter, 
which judgment is patently fraudulent and voidable in light 
of the record as it stands, such a denial of due process 
should not be allowed to stand and the judgment of the 
lower Gourjt and the Order of the Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
should be reversed by this honorable court and Rule 
3(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declared 
unconstitutional. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH L. ROTHEY 
2275 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney forJDefendant. 
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